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ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATION 
AND THE FRONTIERS OF 
GATEKEEPING 
WILLIAM H. SIMON* 
Introduction 
I spend more than half of my Professional Responsibility (“PR”) survey 
course discussing issues distinctive to organizational clients.  I do so in part 
to take into account the realities of practice.  If we can generalize from 
John Heinz and Edward Laumann’s Chicago study, about sixty-five percent 
of lawyering time is devoted to organizational clients.  Yet, the PR issues 
involved in representing organizational clients occupy a comparatively 
small portion of legal doctrine, casebooks, and scholarship. 
Another reason I emphasize organizational clients is that recent 
developments in this sphere, especially in securities and tax, have great 
general interest. 
First, these developments represent fairly strong modifications or 
reinterpretations of traditional doctrine on confidentiality and disclosure.  
The tax rules, in particular, expand the idea of the lawyer as gatekeeper at 
the expense of traditional confidentiality to a more radical extent than 
academic critics have ever proposed, or perhaps would have even have 
contemplated, prior to their enactment. 
Second, the securities and tax initiatives represent radical departures 
from the traditional institutional structure of professional regulation 
centered on state judiciaries and bar associations.  Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter “S-Ox”) represents the first 
federal statute in the history of the country to regulate lawyers directly and 
broadly.  The second came two years later in the form of the tax 
enforcement provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. 
One way to view these developments is as manifestations of the trend 
toward fragmentation or contextualization of doctrine identified by David 
                                                          
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Thanks to Susan Carle for 
advice and encouragement.  
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Wilkins and John Leubsdorf.  But the securities and tax developments have 
more general significance as well.  The securities norms are simply the 
most developed effort to date to take account of a longstanding and often-
ignored problem that arises with any organizational client—what does it 
mean to be loyal to an entity that consists of multiple constituencies with 
potentially conflicting interests? 
For their part, the new tax norms are a response to a problem that arises 
in many areas of both public and private law—the use of literalistic or 
formalistic interpretation to frustrate or evade implicit understanding or 
responsibility.  Thus, one could see the securities and tax developments as 
augurs of a broader change. 
At the same time, there is an interesting difference in the security and tax 
bar’s response to the gatekeeper idea—or the concept that the lawyer’s role 
should involve more public responsibility than it traditionally has.  In the 
securities realm, practitioners have uniformly resisted the gatekeeper role, 
and they have been politically effective—though only partially—in muting 
reform.  In the tax area, as Tanina Rostain has reported, paractitioners have 
been divided, and professional opposition to reform has had much less 
effect. 
Securities 
The core of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an “up-the-ladder” reporting 
requirement.  In essence, it mandates that lawyers who encounter evidence 
that agents of their organizational clients are violating the securities laws or 
fiduciary duties report such violations to senior executives.  Thereafter, the 
reporting lawyers must either (a) ascertain that any problems have been 
rectified or (b) make sure the board is aware of the evidence. 
In principle, this is not a radical intervention, and its requirements were 
arguably implicit in the pre-existing Model Rule (“MR”) 1.13.  However, 
S-Ox does innovate in important respects.  First, the pre-existing 1.13 
requirements were highly ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so; S-Ox is 
comparatively specific. 
Second, S-Ox subverts a strong managerialist inclination that is 
powerfully influential in practice and occasionally surfaces in doctrine.  
This tendency encourages lawyers to identify the organizational client with 
the managers with whom they deal directly and who make the decisions to 
retain them.  By contrast, S-Ox encourages the lawyer to identify the 
corporation with its board, and particularly, the independent directors.  This 
is a big step in the right direction, and sometimes requires difficult action 
on the part of lawyers. 
Third, in one aspect, S-Ox departs notably from the 
fragmentation/contextualization view.  Although S-Ox by its terms applies 
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only to public corporations, revisions to MR 1.13 designed to improve 
consistency with S-Ox have expanded these guidelines to encompass all 
organizational clients. 
S-Ox contributes to the gatekeeping trend that has virtually eliminated 
the practical significance of confidentiality in the organizational context.  
This expansion of the gatekeeper ideal complements other doctrines.  These 
doctrines include: first, the doctrine of Garner v. Wolfenbarger, 430 F. 2d 
1093 (5th Cir. 1970) that allows plaintiffs in shareholder suits who satisfy 
certain conditions to discover privileged communications between 
managers and the organization’s lawyers; second, the doctrine of CFTC v. 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), which holds that when the corporation is 
in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee controls the corporate privilege even 
with respect to communications before bankruptcy. 
The third is the longstanding evidence doctrine, wherein privilege does 
not apply to “underlying facts.”  This means that a lawyer representing a 
corporation in connection with civil discovery or securities compliance 
must disclose damaging information even when learned from a confidential 
communication. 
The cumulative effect of these doctrines is that a lawyer for an 
organization is virtually never in a position to honestly and credibly 
reassure the organization’s agents that they will not be worse off for having 
confided individually damaging information. 
Nevertheless, the securities bar continues to resist gatekeeper 
responsibilities on the grounds that they compromise confidentiality.  We 
can see this in two notable campaigns of recent years. 
First, the securities bar defeated the SEC’s “noisy withdrawal” proposal 
that would have required lawyers withdrawing from representing public 
companies to announce that fact in an SEC filing and explain the reasons 
for the withdrawal, as auditors have long been required to do. 
Second, the bar, in a bizarre alliance with the ACLU and the United 
States Chamber of Commerce, forced the DOJ to limit its practice of 
requiring corporations, as a condition of deferred prosecution, to waive 
attorney-client privilege with respect to internal investigations of 
wrongdoing. 
In both cases, the securities bar’s arguments rested on claims that 
compliance is impeded by gatekeeping responsibilities because such 
responsibilities impair managerial trust in lawyers.  But the claims about 
managerial trust rest on a largely mythical portrayal of the power of 
confidentiality in the corporate context. 
Tax 
The IRS supplements and preempts state PR law in the tax area in 
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several ways.  First, under regulations known as Circ. 230, the IRS 
regulates the support threshold a position must have before the practitioner 
can (1) sign a return based on it, or even (2) give written advice with 
respect to it.  The rules vary by situation, but in all instances the 
requirements are higher than those prescribed by the relevant Model Rules, 
especially 3.1, which might be read to authorize any non-frivolous position. 
Second, a variety of interventions have contributed to the dramatic 
curtailment of the more aggressive practices associated with the corporate 
tax shelters of the 1990s.  They include: 
• a set of rules regulating opinions given for the purposes of “penalty 
protection”; i.e., opinions that recipient can use to demonstrate good faith 
as a defense to penalties in the event it is found to have underpaid.  Here 
the requisite threshold of validity rises to fifty percent.  These rules may 
become less important due to the cutback in “penalty protection” in 2010 
legislation; 
• a requirement that lawyers who play a substantial role with respect to 
shelter-like “reportable transactions” maintain and produce on demand lists 
of clients involved in the transactions; 
• a requirement, addressed to clients but important for lawyers, that 
“questionable tax positions” be affirmatively disclosed on the return; 
• most radically, lawyers who give material advice or assistance with 
respect to “reportable transactions” are obliged to report the advice on their 
own initiative to the IRS on an “information return.” 
While far more radical than the securities developments, these reforms 
have not prompted the uniform resistance on the part of the tax bar; indeed 
important portions have been embraced and encouraged by prominent 
members of the tax bar.  These members have responded to perceived 
weaknesses in the regulatory regime, not by trying to distinguish 
themselves in their willingness to exploit them, but by publicizing them in 
ways designed to assist and pressure the regulators to close them. 
Ambiguities of Contextualization, or A Tale of Two Bars 
As an abstract matter, we can imagine that both ideology and self-
interest might lead business lawyers in two directions: (1) toward a 
champion or gladiator model that emphasizes lawyers’ role in protecting 
client autonomy from state power; (2) toward a gatekeeper or intermediary 
model that emphasizes lawyers’ role in mediating between private and 
public interests. 
In the first model, we would expect lawyers to take an adversarial 
posture against the state and to compete for clients in terms of their relative 
willingness to assist in the evasion or frustration of costly regulation 
through aggressive planning and litigation.  We would also expect them to 
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resist practice standards and to embrace, or at least tolerate, a race to the 
bottom. 
In the second model, we would expect lawyers to take a collaborative 
posture toward the state and to compete in terms of their ability to induce 
regulators to trust their clients and to devise modes of compliance that 
achieve public goals at lower private costs.  For example, regulators and 
private collaborators who trust the client will reward her with less costly 
rules, verification, and monitoring procedures.  Here, we would expect to 
see leading lawyers supporting publicly enforced high standards as a means 
of avoiding a race to the bottom. 
An important sector of the tax bar seems to have embraced something of 
an intermediary approach, while the securities bar seems to be generally 
ambivalent.  It portrays its main function as, ultimately, compliance, but it 
resists direct gatekeeping responsibilities in the name of a managerialist 
conception of client loyalty and a largely mythical norm of confidentiality. 
No doubt the contrasting trajectories are an instance of contextualization.  
But there remains the question of whether the particular configuration of 
contextualization should be understood in functional terms or in some other 
way.  Have securities and tax played out differently because differing 
practical circumstances make the optimal role of a lawyer different in the 
two contexts?  Or should we understand the differences more in historical 
and political terms? 
A functionalist explanation might emphasize that securities enforcement 
does not depend entirely on an understaffed agency but benefits from the 
vigilance of investment bankers, investors, and an active plaintiffs’ bar.  
Tax enforcement, on the other hand, largely depends on a woefully 
understaffed IRS. 
A historical explanation would point out that there is a longstanding 
tradition within the elite tax bar that embraces the gatekeeping role, a 
tradition that seems to have emerged independently of public or market 
pressures. 
A political explanation might point to a difference in the competitive 
situation of securities and tax lawyers.  The barriers to entry in tax practice 
are fairly low, and in a race to the bottom, traditional qualifications may 
count for less than amoral aggressiveness and willingness to take risks.  
Elite lawyers may find it easier to support  high standards if the standards 
neutralize the advantages of less credentialed but more aggressive 
competitors.  By contrast, barriers to entry in securities practice are much 
higher, and elite practitioners have less cause to worry that low standards 
will permit uncredentialed upstarts to eat their lunch. 
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Conclusion 
All these explanations seem to have merit; I don’t have a view as to how 
they should be weighed.  A point about which I am confident is that we 
need to attend to these developments in securities and tax both because the 
areas are intrinsically important and because some of the innovations in 
these areas represent alternative approaches to professional regulation that 
may turn out to have more general application. 
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